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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
V, 
HENRY S. BRUCE, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860325 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Henry Bruce for 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). A jury found him guilty following 
a trial on April 24-29, 1986, in the Third District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. 
Russon, Judge, presiding. Mr. Bruce was committed to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term of five years to life. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
HENRY S. BRUCE, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860325 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Statement of issues, Statement of the Case and 
Statement of Facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at pages 
iv through 8. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
(Reply to State's Point V) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
REDUCE THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
TO SIMPLE ROBBERY. 
The State correctly concedes that this Court's recent 
decision in State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)/ requires 
that Mr. Branch's conviction be reduced from aggravated robbery to 
simple robbery. 
POINT II. 
(Reply to State's Point I) 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN DENYING THE DEFENSE MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM AN ILLEGAL STOP AND 
ARREST OF MR. BRUCE. 
The State relies on State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 
1983), to contend that Mr. Bruce is precluded from appellate 
review—and ultimate relief—for failing to preserve this issue for 
appeal when he did not object at trial despite having made a 
pre-trial motion to suppress the challenged evidence (Brief of 
Respondent at 4). The State's reliance on Lesley is misplaced. 
In State v. Johnson, No. 20814, slip opinion at 3 (Utah 
December 31, 1987), this Court stated: 
[T]he rule in Lesley does not require a defendant to 
object or to renew his motion to suppress at trial 
where the trial judge is also the judge who ruled on 
the pretrial motion and where the record or 
transcript indicates that an evidentiary hearing was 
held. Since the trial judge in this case was also 
the judge who presided at the suppression hearing, 
the defendant's failure to object at trial did not 
constitute a waiver of his Fourth Amendment claim. 
Id. at 3. In the case at bar, an evidentiary hearing on the motion 
to suppress was held (R. 216-26). The trial judge presided over 
that hearing. Accordingly, Mr. Bruce did not waive his right to 
appellate review as contended by the State. 
The State suggests that Mr. Bruce "makes no effort to 
shoulder his burden on appeal of showing that he was substantially 
prejudiced by the admission of the challenged evidence" (Brief of 
Respondent at 5), and cites State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 
(Utah 1986), for the proposition that "introduction of fruits of 
[an] unlawful search and seizure was harmless error in that there 
was sufficient untainted evidence to sustain the defendant's 
convictions." Brief of Respondent at 5. 
In the Brief of Appellant, Point II, pages 13 through 22, 
Mr. Bruce demonstrates the prejudical nature of the evidence in the 
present case. Unlike the situation in Nickles, the questioned 
evidence is not buttressed by other evidence which could alone 
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support the conviction. Rather, the challenged evidence in this 
case is the tree from which all other evidence blossomed; the 
unlawful police action which procured the evidence requires that all 
the fruits of that tree be suppressed. 
POINT III. 
(Reply to State's Point III.) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. BRUCE'S 
PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF HIS 
PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
The State's assertion that this Court should continue to 
rely on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984) to resolve the 
Rule 609(a)(2) issue is not persuasive. This Court decided State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1333 (Utah 1986), a Rule 609 (a)(1) question, 
recognizing that the new Utah Rules of Evidence were "to provide a 
fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this state."1 
Moreover, this Court confirmed the Rule Committee's intent to 
achieve uniformity with the federal rules by advocating a look to 
the interpretation by the federal courts to help interpret the new 
Utah rules. Ijd^  at 1333-34. 
In deciding Banner, this Court, looked to the federal 
decisions and relied on United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976), for the historical perspective and Congressional intent 
of Rule 609. Banner at 1334 nn. 41, 43, and 45. This Court should 
not now cling to State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984), but 
^The new rules were taken from the Federal Rules of Evidence 
verbatim in most cases. The new rules were adopted April 13, 1983, 
and became effective September 1, 1983. Banner at 1332. 
rather should again follow the well-documented and well-reasoned 
opinion of the Smith court in deciding the 609(a)(2) question. 
Cintron should be rejected in favor of the continuing "fresh start" 
and "uniformity with the federal rules" as intended. 
POINT IV. 
(Reply to State's Point II) 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FACING TO 
SUPPRESS OFFICE MERRICK'S IN COURT 
IDENTIFICATION OF MR. BRUCE. 
Eyewitness identification testimony has been recognized 
by this Court as suspect. See, e.g., State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
488 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that human perception is both limited 
and suspect and articulating the inherent problems of eyewitness 
testimony in detail). This Court has also acknowledged that despite 
the inherent problems of eyewitness testimony, jurors give such 
testimony great weight—even when unwarranted. Id. at 490-91 
(citing several studies and articles supporting the contention that 
an eyewitness considerably increases the chance of conviction). 
As argued in Point V of Appellant's opening brief, 
eyewitness identification was a critical issue in the present case. 
Three of the witnesses were unable to identify Mr. Bruce at a line 
up, two of those witnesses actually picked another individual while 
the third picked noone. (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 39-46). 
The testimony of Officer Merrick, the only remaining witness, was 
critical to the state's case under such circumstances. Furthermore, 
because of Officer Merrick's position as a police officer, jurors 
would arguably assess him as a qualified and credible witness. 
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Accordingly, the state's assertion that Mr. Bruce is unable to 
demonstrate a likelihood that injustice resulted in not persuasive. 
POINT V, 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
As Mr. Bruce argued in his opening brief at 34-46, the 
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give the requested 
eyewitness identification instruction. In State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 
1187, 1190 (Utah 1987), this Court acknowledged that it had "never 
found an abuse of discretion when a judge refused a cautionary 
instruction in a case with more than one eyewitness. . .". 
Considering the number of witnesses, rather than the quality of the 
"identifications" does not directly address the question as to 
whether serious questions as to reliability of the identification 
exist. In the present case, where Officer Merrick's identification 
was tainted by the suggestible circumstances under which he viewed 
Mr. Bruce's photo, and the three other witnesses were unable to pick 
Mr. Bruce from a lineup, there were serious questions as to the 
reliability of the in court identifications. 
Just as four trials in which reversible error occur do 
not constitute a fair trial, four seriously flawed in court 
identifications do not combine to make a reliable identification. 
Witnesses viewing a defendant at counsel table are more likely to 
select that person as the perpetrator simply because they know that 
the person has been charged and the state believes the person 
committed the crime. This tendency to select the defendant whether 
- 5 -
or not a witness actually is able to identify the defendant as the 
person who committed the crime is illustrated by the comment at the 
preliminary hearing by one of the witnesses in this case who, after 
identifying Mr. Bruce as the robber, stated "I don't know what he 
looks like. He did it, so what is the big deal?" (R. 338-39). 
Although four people ultimately pointed a finger at Mr. Bruce, three 
were unable to do so except when he was seated at counsel table and 
the fourth, Officer Merrick, had studied Mr. Bruce's picture after 
he was booked on the charge. Under such circumstances, the lack of 
reliability of the identifications rather than the number of 
witnesses should be the focus in determining whether the judge 
abused his discretion in failing to give the requested instruction. 
However, in the event this Court is persuaded by the 
State's contention that no abuse of discretion occurred, Mr. Bruce 
would respectfully request that this Court reconsider its 
prospective application of the decision in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 
483 (Utah 1986), that a cautionary eyewitness identification 
instruction be given to the jury whenever eyewitness identification 
is at issue. Long at 492. 
Mr. Bruce bases the requested reconsideration of Long's 
prospective application on a recent opinion from the United States 
Supreme Court examining the issue of whether such decisions should 
be given prospective or retroactive application. Griffith v. 
Kentucky, 479 U.S. , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S.Ct. (1987). 
Mr. Bruce proffers that the reasoning in Griffith is compelling and 
warrants full consideration. The effect of adhering the logic and 
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rationale of Griffith in the Long context would be to enhance the 
fair and impartial administration of justice. 
In Griffith/ the United States Supreme Court held that 
the decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. , 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 
106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), that a prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude blacks from a jury may violate equal 
protection should be applied retroactively. The Griffith Court 
stated: 
[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional 
rule to criminal cases pending on direct review 
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. 
Griffith/ 93 L.Ed.2d at 658. The Court further acknowledged: 
[A]fter we have decided a new rule in a case 
selected/ the integrity of the judicial review 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar 
cases pending on direct review . . . [and that] it 
is the nature of judicial review that precludes us 
from "simply fishing one case from the stream of 
appellate reviewf using it as a vehicle for 
pronouncing new constitutional standards/ and then 
permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to 
flow by unaffected by that new rule." 
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
The Griffith Court also noted that "selected application 
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated 
defendants the same" and that "the problem with not applying new 
rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that 
results when the court chooses which of many similarly situated 
defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule." id. at 
658-59 (citations omitted). The Court then examined the "clear 
break" exception whereby courts had applied prospectively only rules 
of criminal procedure deemed to be a "clear break" with precedent. 
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The Court disapproved such a "clear break" exception and held that 
"a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be 
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on 
direct review, . . with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a 'clear break1 with the past. id. at 661. 
In Long this Court recognized that the failure to give a 
cautionary eyewitness identification instruction could deny the 
defendant due process of law under Article I, Section 7, of the Utah 
Constitution. In the case at bar the failure to give such an 
instruction violated Mr. Bruce's right to due process of law under 
the Utah Constitution; and the failure to apply Long retroactively, 
where such a constitutional violation occurred, violates Mr. Bruce's 
right to due process and equal protection of the law under both the 
United States and Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, Mr. Bruce respectfully requests that this 
Court reconsider the Long decision and require that prospective 
application is proper for his case and all others pending on direct 
review at the time of the decision in Long. A decision to the 
contrary would deny justice generally to those—including Mr. 
Bruce—who are similarly situated to the appellant in the Long 
case. Eyewitness testimony was a critical issue in Mr. Bruce's case 
(see Brief of Appellant, Facts and Points IV and V); he therefore 
merits a new trial where the cautionary instruction is given to the 
jury. 
CONCLUSION 
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bruce asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand his case to the 
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trial court for a new trial devoid of the errors cited above. 
Respectfully submitted this p day of January, 1988. 
DEBRA K. LOY 7 
Attorney for Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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